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EXPECTATIONS AND COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION
INSTITUTIONS
David L. Dickinson

Preliminary Draft
ABSTRACT

Arbitration is a growing method of resolving disputes in varied settings. While two
specific arbitration rules dominate in practice, other procedures have been hypothesized to better
promote voluntary settlement. Such hypotheses require theoretical assumptions of identical
bargainer expectations even though divergent expectations or optimism is considered prevalent
in naturally occurring negotiations. This article examines disputant behavior in a controlled
laboratory setting where point-estimates of disputant expectations are captured, thus allowing
one to test the "chilling effect" hypotheses of optimism on both dispute rates and final-offer
divergence. The extent of the dual chilling effect is examined for both commonly used
arbitration procedures as well as for an innovative procedure that, while not used in practice, is
theoretically predicted to induce final-offer convergence when expectations are unbiased. The
results show that optimism is prevalent in the data, extra information does not fully de-bias the
disputants, and optimism increases both dispute rates and final-offer divergence. The degree to
which a final offer plays a strategic role in the arbitration institution is an important determinant
of this final chilling effect result. Lastly, once the effects of optimism are considered, the
innovative arbitration procedure actually generates the highest dispute rates, contrary to its
theoretical claim.

EXPECTATIONS AND COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION
INSTITUTIONS*

1. Introduction

Arbitration is currently used to resolve disputes in a variety of arenas. Labor disputes,
commercial contract disputes, lemon-law disputes, environmental disputes, and securities
industry disputes, among others, all utilize arbitration to generate binding settlements. The
Supreme Court also ruled in 2001 that employers can require workers to arbitrate job-related
disputes as a condition of employment, and so the impetus of the U.S. legal system is to increase
the use of arbitration and selectively use it as a replacement for traditional litigation. 1 Two forms
of arbitration rules dominate in practice: Conventional arbitration (CA) allows the arbitrator to
impose any settlement on the disputants, whereas in final-offer arbitration (FaA) the arbitrator is
constrained to choose one of the disputant's final offers as the binding settlement. Bargaining
outcomes are likely to be affected by which arbitration institution is utilized. Additionally,
disputant expectations playa key role in the likelihood of voluntary versus arbitrated settlements.
Optimistic expectations about the likely outcomes generated by arbitration will lower the
perceived "price" of arbitrated settlements and likely increase the quantity demanded of
arbitrated settlements (i.e., the dispute rate).
This article examines the effects of disputant expectations on distinct arbitration
institutions. The institutional comparison is conducted in a controlled laboratory setting.

"'The research was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-O 133231, for which the author is
grateful. Partial support was also provided by the Utah State University Agricultural Experiment Station. Valuable
comments were provided by XXXXXXXXXXX. The author is grateful to Kamalakar Thota, Pablo F. Rego Barros,
Jianlin Cheng, Lujun Zhang, and Stacie Gomm for their programming services in creating the computerized
bargaining environment. The author also thanks Nitesh Saha for his valuable research support.
IThe case is Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 99-1379.
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Bargaining outcomes are examined in the context of CA, FOA, and an innovative procedure
called "combined arbitration" (CombA). CombA is developed in Brams and Merrill (1986) and
it combines the rules of CA and FOA in a way that produces theoretically convergent final
offers. Basically, the rules ofFOA are used if the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies
between the disputants' final offers, but CA rules are used otherwise. Though not used in
practice, the theoretical property of convergent final offers in CombA is more attractive than the
final offer predictions for either CA or FOA, and the laboratory offers an ideal setting to
compare this innovative arbitration procedure with the commonly used CA and FOA procedures.
Biased expectations of likely arbitration awards may, however, alter [mal offer and/or dispute
rate predictions, and so a key contribution of the article is the point-estimates of disputant
expectations that are elicited in the bargaining experiments. Such expectations estimates allow
disputant optimism to be documented and their potentially distinct effects across arbitration
institutions measured. Given that optimism (or self-serving bias, divergent expectations, etc.) is
considered prevalent in many bargaining contexts, this connection between optimism and
bargaining outcomes under different dispute resolution institutions is key to our ability to
interpret field data on arbitration and suggest likely avenues to improve bargaining outcomes
under increasingly used arbitration.
The results indicate that optimism is prevalent in the data, not easily eliminated, and it
significantly increases the probability of dispute as well as the divergence between disputants'
[mal bargaining positions (i.e., final offers). Optimism's effect on final offers is also a function
of the degree to which the final offers playa strategic role in the arbitration institution. When
arbitration explicitly utilizes final offers in the decision rule, then optimism "chills" bargaining to
a greater degree. This is important because if the arbitration rules constrain the arbitrator to
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choose one of the disputant's final offers, then increasingly divergent final offers implies more
divergent arbitrated outcomes, which may reduce the acceptability of the arbitration institution.
Also, holding expectations constant, dispute rates are actually highest in CombA, perhaps
contrary to the intuition of the convergent final offers theoretical prediction, which is a principle
argument in support of the innovative procedure. Implications are discussed in the concluding
section of the article.

2. Background
The increasing use of arbitration to resolve disputes is part of a broader move to utilize
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, such as mediation, arbitration, and fact-finding,
to help resolve disputes. Binding arbitration is unique in that it guarantees a settlement and so it
is used primarily where continued impasse has been deemed unacceptable or undesirable. In
labor disputes, for example, binding arbitration is often used as a replacement for strike rights in
contract disputes for critical service industry workers (e.g., firefighters, policemen, etc.). Such
disputes covering labor contract terms for large numbers of workers can involve millions of
dollars. One needs look no farther than Major League Baseball salary disputes, which are settled
by FOA rules, to understand that magnitude of settlement dollars handled by arbitration in just
one isolated industry. Considering that arbitration is utilized in a very wide variety of industries
and settings to resolve disputes, the cumulative dollars involved in a given year are significant. 2
Given that millions of dollars are allocated every year through commonly used arbitration
procedures, a comparison of outcomes under CA and FOA is desirable. The original argument

2Consider other more varied examples of arbitration: Arbitration was used to award "$16 million to the
heirs of Abraham Zap ruder for the sale to the U.S. government of Zapruder's historic home movie ... " capturing the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Dispute Resolution Times). Also, President George Washington's will
calls for arbitration of any disputes over interpretation of his will (contained in the records of Fairfax County,
Virginia). Ashenfelter et al. (1992) also notes that the death sentence of Socrates in ancient Athens was handed
down using a type of arbitration similar to FOA.
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behind the creation ofFOA rules was that the constrained arbitrator decision-rule would create
greater outcome uncertainty and reduce the so-called "chilling" effect of arbitration (see Stevens,
1966). The theoretical research that followed showed this to not necessarily be the case as the
obvious strategic nature of final offers in FOA lead to predictions of divergent disputant final
offers (Farber, 1980; Crawford, 1979; Brams and Merrill, 1983). It is for this reason that
CombA (Brams and Merrill, 1986) seems attractive. The theoretical prediction is that final
offers converge, which seems to indicate that voluntary settlement is likely. From a theoretical
standpoint CombA seems to be an improvement upon the incentives of CA and FOA, though
biased expectations may confound a more pure test of their relative incentive effects.
Empirical research comparing outcomes under distinct arbitration institutions has
included both field research in public sector labor disputes and experimental research. There has
been mixed results in determining whether bargaining outcomes are better in CA or FOA, and
most of the research focuses on dispute rates as the metric for gauging the success of an
arbitration procedure. The early field evidence indicated that dispute rates are lower in FOA
than CA (Feuille, 1975), but it is also argued that for a given dispute rate the arbitrated
settlements in FOA will likely be of lower quality than those in CA given that FOA awards are
typically more extreme (Feigenbaum, 1975). More recent evidence from the public sector also
show lower dispute rates in FOA (Hebdon, 1996). A critique offield results is that not all
jurisdictions studied include the same rules for what may be categorized as a particular dispute
resolution procedure. Fiegenbaum (1975) highlights how FOA rules can be quite different from
state to state, and commentary in Bolton and Katok (1998) emphasizes the difficulty in finding
comparable field negotiations.3

3mfact, Fiegenbaum (1975) notes that the statute in Michigan makes FOA function more like med-arb,
where the arbitrator fmds himself mediating to some extent as parties alter their fmal offers. Given that dispute rates
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Mock negotiations experiments can ensure that the dispute resolution procedures are, in
fact, similar. Such efforts have also shown dispute rates to be higher in CA compared to FOA
(Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Grigsby and Bigoness, 1982; Notz and Starke, 1978). Though rich
in context and similarity to simple field negotiations, such mock negotiation simulations fail to
control the arbitrator decision-making process, which may introduce confounding effects into the
data. Ashenfelter et al. (1992) models preferred arbitrator settlements as a density function to
mechanize the arbitrator decision-making process and find higher dispute rates in FOA
compared to CA. More recent experimental evidence in Dickinson (in press) also find higher
dispute rates in FOA, and so more recent laboratory data is at odds with previous findings. 4
A separate line of research has examined the role of divergent expectations as a cause of
dispute. Farber and Bazerman (1989) note that it is a " ... prominent explanation for
disagreement in bargaining ... " (p.99). Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) discuss what they call a
"self-serving bias" as a cause of bargaining impasse, and they note the body of evidence in
support of this rather widespread existence of this phenomenon. Further empirical evidence is
found in Neale and Bazerman (1985), Loewenstein et al. (1993), Babcock et al. (1995), and
Farmer at al. (2001), which all highlight the role that optimism can play in disputes. The data
here seem quite consistent and in line with theoretical models of how optimism can cause
bargaining failure (e.g., see Shavell, 1982; Priest and Klein, 1984).
It is clear that optimism contributes to bargaining failure and, therefore, higher dispute

rates. What this present article contributes is a systematic examination of the effects of disputant

are uniformly higher when mediation is used it is perhaps not surprising that FOA generates such low dispute rates
in this context (see also Rehmus, 1974).
40ther experimental research has included a mechanized arbitrator to resolve disputes in bargaining but
these studies do not focus on comparing outcomes across different arbitration institutions (e.g., Chamess, 2000;
Pecorino and Van Boening, 2001; Bolton and Katok, 1998)
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expectations and optimism across distinct laboratory-controlled arbitration mechanisms. While
Babcock et al. (1995) argue that a context-rich experiment, such as their case study experiment,
is more likely to allow optimism to manifest itself, we find evidence of optimism even in the
neutral-context lab experiments studied herein. As such, one could consider the present results
as a conservative measure of the likely chilling effect of optimism on bargaining. There is also
presently no evidence in experimental economics on the effects of optimism in a setting that
controls the arbitrator decision process. Finally, there is little if any evidence on bargaining
outcomes using innovative arbitration procedures, such as CombA, and the laboratory is a
natural place to dry-run a new institution like CombA at low cost (see, e.g., Smith, 1982).
Dickinson (in press) is the only empirical study of bargaining outcomes under CombA, and his
results suggest that optimism may be an important determinant of the dispute rate differences
across arbitration institutions that he reports. This article contributes by measuring the effects of
optimism across an innovative and both commonly used arbitration procedures.

3. The "Chilling Effect" Hypotheses
Our expectations-effect hypotheses examine both dispute rates and final-offer divergence
of the disputants. Weare clear to identify these separate effects of optimism though the
literature seems to interchangeably speak of higher dispute or more divergent final offers as
equivalent manifestations of the chilling effect in bargaining.
In examining dispute rates, consider that a disputant's expected utility of impasse or
co

dispute is given by fh(x)g(x) dx, where hex) represent the disputant's beliefs about likely
-co

outcomes in the event of a dispute and g(x) describes a well-behaved payoff function. Here, we
consider that utility is increasing in x, and so this would be appropriate for analysis of our
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bargainer B, the seller, expected payoffs. This expected utility framework is motivated by
Farber and Katz (1979). In CA, h(x)=f{x), which is just the arbitrator settlement distribution, but
in FOA or CombA, hex) is a function ofbothf{x) and the arbitration rules that utilize final offer
information (e.g., in FOA hex) is a bimodal distribution with all of its mass at final offers Xa and
Xb). Given this framework, optimism is simple to analyze in the sense that it reflects a more

favorable hex) distribution. This could imply an optimistic location is the distributions mean, or
a self-serving perceived skewness in the shape of hex). Either way, it implies a higher expected
payoff in the event of dispute when beliefs about the uncertain outcomes possibilities of impasse
are optimistic, ceteris paribus. Disputes are just an alternative way of achieving an outcome
compared to voluntary settlement, and so a decline in the relative cost or price of a disputed
outcome follows from optimism. This decline in relative price of dispute would increase the
demand for disputed or arbitrated outcomes when one views disputes as a "good" as in this
framework. Therefore, we have:
Chilling Hypothesis #1:

Optimism will increase dispute rates across all arbitration
procedures.

The other dimension of optimism's potential chilling effect lies in its potential to increase
the divergence between disputants' final offers or final bargaining positions. When viewed as
distinct from the dispute rate hypothesis it may seem a trivial concern, but [mal offers can be
viewed as an indicator of how close the parties are too agreement. Additionally, since FOA and
in some cases CombA constrain the arbitrator to select one of the final offers, more divergent
[mal offers implies more extreme and potentially less acceptable arbitrated awards.
One can establish in each of the three arbitration institutions examined that optimism
implies more divergent [mal offers than unbiased expectations. In CombA, expectations can
even be optimistic to a degree while still preserving the convergence property of the procedure.

8
However, Brams and Merrill (1986) show that final offers will eventually diverge in CombA if
expectations are optimistic enough. In FOA, Dickinson (2003) shows that optimism will cause
final offers to diverge under both a naIve and a more sophisticated version of disputant beliefs.
Finally, in CA, the framework of Farber (1981) shows that, if final offers are considered by the
arbitrator in the final arbitrated settlement decision, then equilibrium final offers are a function
of, among other things, the mean expected value of the arbitrator settlement distribution. As
such, one can show that optimism implies more divergent fmal offers in CA as well (see Farber's
Nash equations (15) and (16) on p.75 of his article). One difference to be noted, however, is that
final offers do not influence the arbitrator in the computerized version of CA. As such, it is less
clear whether or not optimism would be predicted to cause more divergent final offers in our
experimental CA, where final offers do not have strategic value in the arbitration institution.
Though CA arbitrators in practice are certainly influenced by the facts of the case, which likely
influence final offers, Ashenfelter (1987) and Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) used field data to
show that it is reasonable to model CA decisions as draws from an unbiased settlement
distribution. The unintended side-effect of a computerized CA arbitrator who ignores final offers
is that our data can also be used to examine the extent to which optimism's predicted final-offer
divergence effect is a function of the strategic nature of final offers in the arbitration institution.
Our second hypothesis is then,

Chilling Hypothesis #2:

When disputes occur, optimism will increase fmal offer divergence
when final offers are strategic to the arbitration institution (FOA
and CombA in the experiments).

4. Experimental Environment
The bargaining environment is described in more detail in Dickinson (in press). Subjects
are randomly and anonymously matched to another subject for a 20-round bargaining
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experiment. The experiment is context-free, and payoff tables for the object of negotiation-an
abstract variable, x-are used to induce win-loss payoff functions on the subjects in their
negotiations. Bargainer A (B) earns more cash in each round of the experiment for lower
(higher) values of x, and offers are made by submitting proposed values of x on the computer
terminal-this is the only communication allowed in the experiment. If subj ects have not agreed
upon a value of x within the 2-minute time limit of the round, one of 4 dispute resolution
procedures is utilized to determine the outcome for the round after final offers are elicited (and
assuming that the final offers do not converge, in which case agreement is automatic): no
arbitration (NA), CA, FOA, or CombA. In NA, impasse is handled by giving both subjects a
zero payoff. In the arbitration treatments, all subjects bargain for 5-rounds under each dispute
resolution treatment. This is a within-subjects design that can more easily identify causal
relationships in the arbitration treatments.
The computerized arbitrator is a Normal (500,60) random number distribution from
which a number is drawn at bargaining impasse in any round of the CA, FOA, and CombA
treatments. As such, the arbitrator's preferred settlement distribution is completely controlled
across arbitration institutions. Payoffs are such that x=500 splits a $2.00 pie for both subjects,
but bargaining ranges are suggested to limit mechanical split-the-pie differences somewhat. 5
Bargainers are always given the opportunity to submit a final offer once the round has ended in
impasse. Assuming that the disputants still do not agree based on converged or criss-crossed
final offers (i.e., buyer final offer, x a, greater than seller final offer, Xb), then the dispute
resolution procedure of that treatment is invoked to settle the round. In NA, both subjects
receive a zero payoff, and in CA the draw from the computerf{x) distribution is the settlement
5Specifically, bargainer A is suggested to negotiate for values of x between 200 and 700, while bargainer B
is suggested to negotiate x between 300 and 800.
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for that round. In FOA and CombA, the disputants' final offers are used along with the draw
fromj(x) to determine the binding settlement based on the rules of each procedure. Whenever
FOA rules are used, the final offer closest to z is chosen as the settlement.
Expectations elicitation occurs at the beginning of all CA, FOA, and CombA rounds. As
such, a point estimate of the subject's expectation of the average value drawn fromj(z) is
recorded whether or not arbitration is invoked by that subject-pair for that round. Subjects will
form their expectations about the computerized arbitrator from the information on the
computerized arbitrator in the experimental instructions. Three related protocols, called Low

Info, Medium Info, and High Info, are used across different experimental bargaining pairs. In
Low Info, subjects are shown a table of 100 draws from the samef{x) used in their experimental
arbitration treatments. This protocol is used in Ashenfelter et al. (1992), among others, as a
method considered most parallel with how real-world disputants would gather information from
the field to form expectations. As we will see, this protocol is also the most likely to allow
subjects to form biased expectations of arbitrator preferences. In Medium Info, subjects are
shown the table of 100 draws, and in addition they are given a picture of the normal density
function used, along with summary statistics that includes the mean of the distribution. In High

Info, subjects are shown the table, the graph, and read aloud a brief prepared written statement by
the experimenter about how subj ects do not always form accurate expectations when uncertainty
is involved (though the direction of the bias was not mentioned).
A monetary incentive was provided to help generate subjects' true expectations. Subjects
were informed that they would be paid an additional $2 on top of other experimental earnings for
an expectation within ten x-units above or below the true averagej(x)-value. They were also
informed that one of their expectations would be drawn randomly at the end of the experiment to
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determine their qualification for the extra expectation incentive. Though not a large monetary
incentive, the data shown later in this article indicate that these point estimates of expectations
increase in accuracy in the higher information protocols. This is what one would expect if the
expectations data from this experimental procedure are a reasonable proxy for subjects' true
expectations. 6

5. Results
Experiments were conducted on a total of 126 bargaining pairs (i.e., 252 total subjects).
Subjects were primarily undergraduate students and payoffs averaged about $20 for a 1.5 hour
experiment, which is a considerably higher hourly wage rate than jobs on campus. Each of the
three distinct arbitrator information protocols were use on approximately equal numbers of
bargaining pairs (45, 41, and 40 pairs for the Low, Medium, and High Info protocols,
respectively). Figure 1 shows the frequency of subject expectations in each of the three
information protocols for buyers and sellers separately. Two items are apparent from Figure 1.
First, subjects were optimistic on average (see also Table 1). This is evidenced by the fact that
expectations of the mean ofj(x) tend to be lower (higher) than the true mean for buyers (sellers).
Each side of the bargaining table expects relatively more favorable settlement draws from the
arbitrator than will actually occur on average.
The second item to note is that the Medium and High Info protocols were only partially
effective at de-biasing the subjects. This does not pose any problem for the ex post data analysis
since expectations can be more fully controlled in the econometric analysis, but it does indicate
that optimism is not easily removed. Recall that in both Medium and High Info subjects are

6Additionally, the fact that only one random round is selected for compensation for accurate expectations
makes it unlikely that any subject would creatively use this to diversify payoff risk (e.g., submit a low expectation
but then a high [mal offer). The data show that expectations and [mal offers are positively not negatively correlated.
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actually given the exact value of the mean ofj{x), and yet only about 50% of the subjects in High

Info had unbiased expectations. One possible explanation is that some subjects did not
understand the information given on the computerized arbitrator, but others have found similar
difficulty in attempting to de-bias optimistic subjects (e.g., Babcock et aI., 1997; Fischhoff,
1977). As such, it seems likely that some subjects are simply not easily swayed in their beliefs,
which presents a challenge in attempting to convey an accurate assessment of likely impasse
outcomes to individuals in naturally occurring bargaining contexts. 7
Additional summary statistics are shown in Table 1. As with Figure 1, optimism is
apparent for the average experimental subj ect. The dispute rate summary statistics are somewhat
less clear in their interpretation from Table 1. It is clear that arbitration of any sort increases
dispute rates over the NA treatment where zero payoffs follow impasse. What is less clear is
how expectations interact with the distinct arbitration institutions. More precise information, as
is given in Medium and High Info seems to lower dispute rates in CA and CombA, but it actually
increases them in FOA. Given that optimism still exists even in High Info, we tum to an
econometric analysis that explicitly controls for the expectations of a given bargaining pair in a
given round as best approach for uncovering the effects of expectations on dispute rates.
Table 2 shows results from the empirical estimation equations that shed light on the
chilling effect hypotheses. Optimism is measured here as pairwise optimism, or seller
expectations minus buyer expectations at the beginning of the bargaining round. Pairwise
optimism (pessimism) exists when seller expectations are greater (less) than buyer expectations.

7Representatives, such as lawyers, may playa key role here in their ability to more objectively assess
outcome probabilities and advise clients. Lawyers are, of course, potentially subject to the self-serving bias as well
(Babcock et al. (1993), but likely to a lesser degree in terms of their client's trial outcome given that the objective
function of the lawyer mayor may not be similar to that of the client. Evidence from the experiments also shows
that optimism persists over time. Optimism seems just as likely in later experimental rounds as in earlier ones.
These results are available upon request.
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Though this approach of measuring expectations is appropriate given that this sort of divergence
in expectations is what drives the chilling effect, this approach makes it possible to have two
pessimistic expectations that are labeled as pairwise optimism (e.g., if seller expectation=480 and
buyer expectation=460). This occurs in a minority of the cases, however, as average
expectations at the individual level are optimistic (Figure 1 and Table 1).
The first column estimates the probability of dispute as a function of the arbitration
treatment effects (NA is the omitted reference treatment), pairwise expectations in each
arbitration treatment (Exp interacted with each arbitration treatment), and the information
protocol used in the experiment (Low Info is the reference protocol). So, HiInfo *FDA gives the
incremental effect of High Info on dispute rates in FOA compared to the Low Info protocol,
which is given by the marginal effect reported on FDA at the top of the column. The model
correctly predicts 66% of the outcomes in the 2520 total subject pair rounds. Random effects are
used to model the heterogeneity in disputes rates across subject pairs and the possible nonindependence in observations within a SUbject-pair but across bargaining rounds.
The main results are in support of the Chilling Hypothesis #1. The marginal effects of
the random effects probit estimation are shown and pairwise optimism is estimated to
significantly increase dispute rates in each arbitration treatment. This is consistent with existing
research examining the self-serving bias or optimism in other contexts (Loewenstein et aI., 1993;
Neale and Bazerman, 1985). The magnitude of the marginal effects is such that a divergence in
expectations of 100 x-units-about 1 2/3 standard deviations of the actual computerj{x)
distribution-increases dispute rate by 8-9%, depending on the arbitration treatment. The effect
of optimism on dispute rates appears to be quite uniform across arbitration treatment. What is
less clear is how subjects respond to the different information protocols. The High Info protocol
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significantly increases dispute rates by 15.5% in FOA, whereas the Medium Info protocol

decreases dispute rates by 11 % in CombA. These are estimated pure protocol effects that are
distinct from the chilling effect estimates of optimism on dispute rates. It is not clear why the
different information protocol would affect subjects differently across arbitration institutions, but
these different protocols are not likely to apply in practice, thus highlighting the need to separate
their effects from the incentive effects of optimism itself.
Once the effects of expectations are measured, the residual effects of the arbitration
treatments themselves are shown in the marginal effects estimates of CA, FOA, and CombA.
The use of arbitration significantly increases the probability of dispute compared to the NA
treatment, not surprisingly. What is perhaps more interesting is that the use of CombA is
predicted to marginally increase dispute rates above NA by the highest amount among the
arbitration treatments considered (greater than CA (p=.04) and FOA (p=.OO) using the chisquared test). The marginal increase in dispute rates is statistically no different in CA and FOA
(p=.23 for the chi-squared test). This is evidence at odds with the idea that CombA might
produce lower dispute rates, ceteris paribus, given its final offer convergence predictions. More
on this will be said in the next section.
The second column of Table 2 examines the effects of divergent expectations on fmaloffer differences (Chilling Hypothesis #2). The results of a random effect model are shown for
the subset of the pooled data where a dispute resolution procedure is invoked (N=1228). Though
the treatment effects, expectations variables, and information protocol variables do not explain
much of the variation in the final-offer differences (adjusted R 2=.10), the significance of the
coefficients on the expectations variables is of interest. Firstly, final offers are significantly more
divergent in the Low Info protocol under CA than in NA, FOA, or CombA, ceteris paribus. The
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higher information protocols mitigate this effect for CA. In terms of evaluating the Chilling
Hypothesis #2, the coefficients on Exp *CA, Exp *FDA, and Exp *CombA indicate that optimism
increases the divergence of final offers. Also given that optimism's effects are largest in FOA
and smallest (insignificantly different from zero) in CA, this is evidence that the chilling effect of
optimism on final-offer divergence is a function of the degree to which final offers playa
strategic role in the arbitration institution. While final offers are strategic in both FOA and
CombA, they are somewhat less so in CombA given that CA rules are used for CombA when the
arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies outside the disputants' final offers. As such, there are
combinations of fmal offers and expected arbitrator settlement preferences for which the final
offers will not constrain the arbitrated settlement.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the chilling effect predictions on CA, FOA,
and CombA as implied by the estimated coefficients in Table 2 for the more externally valid Low
Info protocol. The forecast values of the final-offer difference are shown over the range of
expectations differences from -100 (pairwise pessimism) to 400 (extreme pairwise optimism),
which is the range containing over 98% of the experimental data. What figure 2 highlights is
that, at least for the range of data containing average levels of optimism, CombA is estimated to
produce the most convergent final offers. What is different from the theoretical predictions of
CombA is that not only are final offers not completely convergent, but the relatively greater
convergence in CombA relative to CA and FOA is only statistically significant for optimistic
disputants-the theoretical convengence results for CombA are for unbiased disputants (Brams
and Merrill, 1986). It is a more important finding, however, that the estimated chilling effect on
final offers seems dependent on the importance on the final offers themselves in the arbitration
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institution, especially if disputants tend to be optimistically biased in naturally occurring
bargaining situations that utilize formal dispute resolution procedures.

6. Discussion
This research seeks to gain a greater understanding of how disputant optimism manifests
itself in bargaining outcomes that utilize arbitration. The controlled laboratory environment
allows precise measurement of disputants' expectations of arbitrated settlement possibilities, and
it also guarantees comparability across arbitration institutions. Outcomes in both commonly
used forms of arbitration as well as an innovative procedure called "Combined Arbitration" are
examined within the context of optimism. The theoretical properties of CombA seem more
attractive than those for CA or FOA, and so a laboratory analysis of this institution is a logical
way to generate initial data on the procedure.
As has been shown in existing research, disputants tend to be optimistic and the optimism
is not easily removed. One cannot claim that this optimism is an artifact of the student-subject
pool that generated this data because others have uncovered similar optimistic beliefs even
among experienced adult negotiators (Babcock et aI., 1993; Babcock et aI., 1996). The
importance of optimism is in its ability to introduce inefficiencies on multiple dimensions-both
higher dispute rates and more divergent [mal offers result from optimism. Dispute rates rise with
the optimism of the bargaining pair across all arbitration institutions studied, and so if selfdetermined outcomes are considered desirable then there is a significant public interest in
mitigating optimism. As noted in Babcock et aI. (1997), certain procedures deemed reasonably
successful at mitigating optimism in practice, such as forcing disputants to think about the
weaknesses in their own bargaining positions, could be easily integrated into existing alternative
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dispute resolution procedures to increase voluntary settlement rates.8 It is also possible that the
use of more objective representatives and/or lawyers may help de-bias the disputants. Though
such individuals are also subject to a self-serving bias (Babcock et aI., 1995), they are likely not
as affected as the disputants themselves. An interesting implication is that legal representation,
though contributing to the formality and cost of arbitration hearings, may offset these higher
costs in terms of improving disputant expectations, which could improve outcomes for both
disputants.
Final offers are also found more divergent for those institutions that utilize final offers
explicitly in their settlement rules. This is the case for both FOA and CombA, but not CA, in our
experiments. The commonly used FOA procedure constrains the arbitrator to choose one of the
final offers as the binding settlement, but we find evidence that such rules interact in a way that
worsens the effects of optimism. Specifically, optimistic disputants submit more divergent final
offers (i.e., final bargaining positions) than unbiased disputants. This may seem trivial since
impasse results whether final offers diverge little or much. When one realizes that these final
offers determine the arbitrated settlement possibilities, then more divergent fmal offers imply a
greater variance in arbitrated settlements. Others have argued how FOA may produce less
desirable or equitable outcomes given the all-or-nothing nature of the settlements it generates
(Feigenbaum, 1975), and so optimism would make the FOA institution even less acceptable.
Acceptability of FOA outcomes are likely quite important in practice as some state jurisdictions'
have chosen to use FOA rules that allow the arbitrator to select among disputant final offers
issue-by-issue for labor contract disputes. Though such issue-by-issue FOA rules may increase
FOA's acceptability, the trade-off is that FOA is no longer the same FOA institution envisioned
8While such a procedure has been found successful in role-playing experiments, a similar procedure was
not possible in this article's abstract bargaining experiments.

18
by Stevens (1966) to reduce arbitration's chilling effect. Absent a concerted effort to mitigate
disputant optimism, such compromise rules for FOA may be a second-best solution, though FOA
then becomes transformed into a more CA-like institution.
Once the effects of optimism are removed from the data, the prediction is that dispute
rates will be highest in CombA (see also Dickinson, in press) and statistical similar dispute rates
in CA and FOA. It appears that the higher dispute rates in FOA versus CA in Ashenfelter et al.
(1992) and Dickinson (in press) may be the result of optimism. Since optimism is also present in
naturally occurring negotiations where FOA often generates lower dispute rates, there are clearly
other factors to be considered in identifying the determinants of dispute rate differences in CA
and FOA found in field data, such as historical practices, type of dispute settle by arbitration, or
procedural differences within CA and/or FOA institutions.
Though the theoretical predictions ofBrams and Merrill (1986) examine disputant final
offers, the authors view is that this will decrease dispute rates, and this is inconsistent with the
observed higher dispute rates in CombA. Two alternative sources of impasse are possible:
asymmetric information and risk preferences. The experimental environment provided identical
information on the arbitration settlement distribution to bargainers A and B. Private payoff
tables and suggested bargaining ranges are a source of asymmetric information, but this source
was identical across dispute resolution procedures. It therefore seems unlikely that asymmetric
information is the cause of higher dispute rates in CombA relative to CA or FOA.
Risk preferences are another potential source of impasse. Though a trustworthy measure
of subject risk preferences is not generated in these experiments, Holt and Laury (2002) report
data from typical student-subject pools indicating that such subjects are, on average, risk averse.
Unfortunately, this may raise more questions than it answers because Dickinson (in press) argues
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that risk aversion would imply lower dispute rates in CombA. Higher dispute rates in CombA
would be consistent with risk loving behavior, but there is no supporting evidence that this is
driving the dispute rate results. One possibility, yet to be explored, is that disputants A and B
frame the bargaining environment differently. Babcock et al. (1995) find evidence in that trial
lawyers as well as student subj ects may frame settlement outcomes as a gain or loss when
assigned to a plaintiff or defendant role, respectively. Since our subjects negotiate over the value
of x, it is possible that disputants A frame this decision task as a "loss" given that higher values
ofx imply lower payoffs to disputant A. The prospect theory work of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) may then imply that disputants A will behave in a risk-loving manner, while disputants B
would behave in a risk-averse manner. This is pure speculation for the present paper, but it
offers one potentially fruitful avenue for further exploration of the cause of higher dispute rates
inCombA.
It seems clear that there are incentive effects of distinct dispute resolution institutions that

have not been fully identified. Nevertheless, there is a strong and consistent message in the
optimism results from the data. In fact, the optimism results seem to strengthen the argument
that dispute resolution can be significantly improved within existing dispute resolution
institutions by addressing the issue of divergent expectations. Efforts can be expended to
improve the structure and settlement incentives of arbitration institutions themselves, but there
does not seem a consistency of evidence indicating that certain arbitration rules are better than
others. Improving the accuracy of disputant expectations offers an avenue for predictably
improving outcomes across a variety of procedures and is likely a key to limiting inefficiencies
in dispute resolution institutions.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Expectations and Dispute Rates
Low Information
Medium Information
Protocol
Protocol

Pooled
data

Expectations
Dispute rate

Buyer

Seller

Buyer

468.5

525.6

477.8

NA
Expectations
treatment Dispute rate
CA
Expectations
treatment Dispute rate

468.0

FOA
Expectations
treatment Dispute rate

467.8

CombA Expectations
treatment Dispute rate

469.6

High Information
Protocol

Seller

Buyer

520.9

484.4

Seller
515.9

52%

47%

57%

20%

16%

14.5%

523.7

484.4

63%

486.9

525.5

473.8

521.7

475.1

517.6

478.2
67%

60%
527.6

515.9
57%

58%

57%

69%

522.0

518.9
54%

Computerized Arbitrator -- Normal (1:!=500,cr=60)

515.5

488.1
57%
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Table 2: Empirical Estimations

Variable
Constant
CA
FOA
CombA
Exp*CA
Exp*FOA
Exp*CombA
MedInfo*CA
HiInfo*CA
MedInfo*FOA
HiInfo*FOA
MedInfo*CombA
HiInfo*CombA

Dependent variable =Dispute

Dependent variable=Final Offer
difference

(Random Effects Probit Model)

(Random Effects Model)

Marginal Effect (p-value)
-.38 (.00)***
.42 (.00)***
.38 (.00)***
.50 (.00)***
.0009 (.00)***
.0008 (.01)***
.0008 (.00)***
.009 (.88)
.014 (.81)
.069 (.28)
.155 (.00)***
-.114 (.05)**
-.066 (.25)

Coefficient (p-value)
80.41 (.00)***
62.69 (.00)***
17.65(.18)
6.04 (.64)
.077(.16)
.36 (.00)***
.23 (.00)***
-.39.80 (.01)***
-53.91 (.00)***
16.61 (.26)
-3.25 (.82)
22.25 (.13)
-9.80 (.50)

N=2520
N=1238
Log Likelihood function
= -1402.188
R 2=.10
*,**,*** show significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.

FIGURE 1: Disputant Expectations By Information Treatment
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FIGURE 2: Predicted Chilling effect of
optimism on final offers (low info protocol)
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